

8 AUG 1975

NSC Review Completed

SUBJECT : Laos - Item Number 15
Senate Select Committee Request of
31 July 1975

1. Attached hereto are various notes and reports relating to the 1961 Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Task Force. This material was requested in Item 15, IV, Second Priority of reference. Please note that some items appear to be internal Agency documents but refer to discussions with White House and National Security Council staff members. Since we have no way of knowing the ultimate disposition or use of some of the documents, we defer to the Review Staff for a decision as to whether the following items should be cleared with the White House or National Security Council prior to their release to the Senate Select Committee:

a. Memorandum for the Record dated 23 June 1961. Subject: Meeting for Discussion on Further Development of Deterrence Paper,

b. Memorandum dated 22 November 1961, Subject: Conversation with Walt Rostow,

c. Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, dated 13 December 1961, Subject: Report on Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Task Force.

d. Memorandum for CA/C/ [REDACTED] dated 2 February 1962. Subject: Background of Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Task Force.

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2. Please note that many memoranda contained in this package make reference to draft attachments which we have not been able to locate. If additional materials are found pertinent to item 15 they will be forwarded.

Attachments:
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23 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting for Discussion on Further Development
of Deterrence Paper

PARTICIPANTS: , DD/P; Mr. Walter
Rostow, White House; General Edward G. Lansdale,
DOD; Mr. Henry Ramsey, Dept. of State;
DD/P

1. The officers named above met in the DD/P conference room at 1130 hours, 22 June 1961, to discuss further action on development of the paper on the subject of the U. S. Capabilities for Detering and Countering Communist Subversion and Guerrilla Operations in Underdeveloped Areas.

2. stated that he felt that there was need for papers in a number of different categories and that in several of these categories, there were already available existing papers which could be pulled together and edited to form a small reference library which could be of valuable assistance in formulating an overall paper. He listed these categories as follows:

a. Historical case studies. A number of such studies are already in existence.

b. Military doctrine. A number of papers, including Frank Lindsay's paper on guerrilla warfare, a recent Dept. of the Army paper on unconventional warfare, and the tactical doctrine for South Vietnam are available.

c. Present and threatening situations. A paper on this subject by OGI dated March 1961 is available.

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d. Communist doctrine. A recent paper by CI/ICD is available as well as works by Mao Tze Tung, Che Guevara, etc.

e. Organizational papers. [noted that in specific cases such as South Vietnam and Laos today, there seems "to be reasonable agreement at high government levels as to responsibilities for action". He felt that there was a need for a sub-paper in this category on responsibilities for unattributed action and that there was some need for a discussion on this subject. He also stated that he felt there was a need for a broader sharing of knowledge in the Executive Branch, noting particularly as an example, the PARU activities and the problems involved.

f. Cuba. [noted that he felt that one point that was missing in the Taylor report is a recognition that if a decision is made to use violence, which will probably involve some degree of attribution, there must be political ^{risks} reports and costs and a determination must be made as to just what kind of ^{risks} reports and costs are acceptable. He noted that Walter Lippman is addressing himself to this problem in recent articles. Mr. Lippman seems to argue that anything that we do must be truly covert, and if that is accepted, what then are the limits within which the U. S. can act? Mr. Rostow pointed out the extent of communist aggression in South Vietnam and queried as to whether do we simply try to cope with it defensively or do we, having established that aggression is taking place, attack Hanoi. General Lansdale remarked on the necessity for establishment of a legal base on which to operate and pointed out how the communists in Laos had recognized a government of their choice and then openly assisted that government.

3. Mr. Rostow then presented in outline form what he considered should be the format for the proposed paper. This was as follows:

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1. A basic summary of the problem. (noted that this should be a brisk, short summary.)
2. Communist techniques.
3. The U. S. role and doctrine.
 - a. Overt
 - b. Covert
 - c. Legal basis - international law
 - d. The role of and attitudes in the UN

II

1. Types of situations. (felt that the approach used in the original outline paper, which establishes several types of situations, was a valuable one and should be made a part of this paper.)
2. Current and foreseeable situations.
 - a. Defensive
 - b. Aggressive (East Germany)

This section should contain a description of just what the U. S. Government is doing in each of the situations that are examined.

3. Description of the current U. S. organization and capability to handle the situations, with particular reference to the foreseeable problems in Africa, and the preparation or lack of preparation being made therefor.

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III Recommendations.

The recommendations should be specific and should be related to concrete cases discussed in the previous parts of the paper. Among items mentioned as properly deserving of specific recommendations are:

- a. The role of diplomatic action.
- b. Clarification of overt-covert actions and responsibilities.
- c. Specific note of areas in which our capabilities are in substantive arrears.
- d. The prompt identification of the establishment of a communist arms base in Africa and the immediate action to be taken thereon.
- e. The effectiveness of our operations in Colombia where there seems to be a grave threat to the government.
- f. Specific recommendations with regard to the UN, with attention paid to the role of the neutral nations, to getting the communist aggression in South Vietnam into the UN, with the suggestion that effort be made to provide Ambassador Stevenson with a documented and pictorial evidence as to the communications network operating from Hanoi to South Vietnam.

4. [redacted] noted that in every problem situation there was always present some element of indigenous revolt. We must develop a concept of what is aggression and then what can legally be done to counter that aggression. In this regard, he again mentioned Colombia and then Cuba stating that we must surface Castro's expanding activities in WH by training, propaganda, arms deliveries, etc.

5. General Lansdale stated that he felt that it must be recognized that there are two kinds of evidence - legal evidence that can be produced

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and will stand up in court, and propaganda evidence such as that used by the Commies in Indonesia which is used to create public opinion rather than to gain a legal decision.

6. In answer to a question on organization, Mr. Rostow stated that the recommendations on organization should be based on concrete cases rather than on abstract reasoning.

7. Mr. Ramsey queried as to the purpose of the paper. Mr. Rostow replied that it was to provide a more profound awareness, probably through the NSC mechanism to the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the DCI of the problems, and to make recommendations for specific regional and country actions, for better structural organization of the UN, and as an example, to highlight to the Department of State the need for various actions with regard to the UN.

8. There was a discussion on the subject of mild versus deep disclaimable operations. East Germany and North Vietnam were illustrative of mild disclaimability, while under current conditions, Cuba and Tibet would represent deep disclaimability.

9. Mr. Rostow re-emphasized the importance of the paper providing, in effect, an order of battle which arrayed our capabilities against our problems.

10. General Lansdale stated that because of some of his problems in the Pentagon, he hoped that a draft of the paper could be provided to circulate through the DOD and that he hoped that the knowledge of continuing development of the paper in the next few weeks could be as limited as possible so that he would not be constantly called on by his associates who might like to participate in the early drafting. It was agreed to set a July 20 deadline for producing a draft to be circulated, and that until such a draft was prepared, the size of the group was to remain as constituted at the meeting. further undertook to produce a draft by 8 or 10 July for circulation just among the participating members.

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11. [redacted] queried Mr. Ramsey as to a paper which he had briefly been shown which had been produced in State and concerns itself with a juridical and moral basis for actions. Mr. Ramsey briefly outlined the purpose of the paper indicating that it did not have formal approval within the Department of State, but agreed to furnish [redacted] with a copy of the paper.

12. Mr. Rostow stated that, in essence, he thought the paper should state how we propose to do things in terms of doctrine, in terms of specific cases, and in terms of organization. He felt that the paper would always be subject to nit-picking, and never be fully accepted, but that it should lead to a number of specific and helpful actions.

13. Mr. Rostow and General Lansdale then had a brief discussion with regard to President Diem's letter to the President requesting a force increase of 100,000. I will not report on this conversation in this memorandum. [redacted] closed the meeting by saying that there were two specific matters which he felt would require decision and action in the very near future. The first was the continuing support of the 9 - 10 thousand MEO's that we have armed in Laos, and the second was reports that had reached him and caused him concern, to the effect that Ambassador Young's proposed programs for Thailand had been running into difficulty in State, apparently largely because of economic reasons.

[redacted]
Covert Action Staff

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22 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: Conversation with Walt Rostow

1. Walt Rostow called me this morning on the paper on deterrence of guerrilla warfare. He seemed to have no particular quarrel with the statements made or the principles enunciated in the draft paper, a copy of which was sent to him on Tuesday morning. He appeared to agree with the thought that this paper was designed to establish a general concensus of agreement concerning the principal factors to be considered in countries where violence and guerrilla warfare are present or imminent and of general over-all courses of action desirable to meet these situations. His specific question was "Where do we go from here?"

2. After some discussion, I believe that we ended in agreement that the next step should be one or more papers concerned with specific aspects of the problems raised by the general paper. These subsidiary papers would outline specific steps which should be taken to put the Government in a position to initiate and carry through integrated programs along the lines indicated in the over-all paper in specific areas.

3. The first and most important subject for specific analysis seems to me, and I think also to Walt, to be the problem of devising an adequate intra-governmental structure to develop, monitor and manage suitable programs. This includes the problem of organization here in Washington both for the purpose of establishing a basis for policy making and for the purpose of exercising continuing supervision of programs once they are initiated. It also includes consideration of the organization of the American community in the field.

4. Related to the problem of the structural organization of the Government to facilitate decisions and management of operations is the question of how best to organize the indigenous community for the purpose of consolidating its resources to meet the attack.

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5. There are a number of subsidiary points suggested by the titles in an earlier memorandum sent by [redacted] which include:

- a. Alerting the International Community.
- b. Socio-Economic Action Programs.
- c. Revamping the MAP for Counter-Guerrilla Emphasis.
- d. Appropriate Range of Covert Activities.
- e. Training Programs.
- f. Counter-Guerrilla Operations.
- g. Counter-Pressures on Hostile Territory.

I am not at the moment personally impressed with the necessity for all of these subsidiary papers. There is at least some question as to whether any of them are really essential.

6. In any event, I left it with Walt that he would be responsible for taking the initiative in developing a draft of a paper at least on the organizational question and of requesting a meeting of the Task Force (presumably early next week) when the draft paper is completed. In the meantime, he is holding a paper, apparently on organization, which I gather was submitted by Hilsman, presumably with Ramsey's concurrence.

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13 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: ✓ Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Report of Counter Guerrilla Warfare Task Force

1. This memorandum contains information for the Special Group Meeting on 14 December.

2. Some eight months ago on the initiative of Mr. McGeorge Bundy and Mr. Walt Rostow I was designated chairman of a small Task Force on the deterrence and countering of guerrilla warfare. Other members were General Lansdale for the Department of Defense, Mr. Henry Ramsey for the Department of State and Mr. Rostow for the White House. In the course of a number of periods of rather intense activity which were interrupted by lulls when members of the Task Force were too busy with other matters, a great deal of writing and rewriting was done which finally resulted on 12 December in the Task Force Report of which a copy is attached hereto.

3. It was understood from the start that the members of the Task Force participated in this work as individuals and did not speak for their Departments or Agencies. This procedure was adopted in part in order to avoid the circulation of successive drafts within the Departments. Upon completion I transmitted copies of the report to Mr. Bundy and General Taylor and through the members of the task force to the Departments of Defense and State. Presumably the White House staff will now ask for the comments of the Departments.

4. Since this report recommends additional responsibilities for General Taylor and for the Special Group, it is of special interest to him. I understand he may mention it to you at the Special Group meeting on 14 December although he understands that the members of the Special Group will not have had time to study it by that date.

Attachment:
Subject Report

Deputy Director
(Plans)

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2 February 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR: CA/C/[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Background of Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Task Force Report

1. For your background information, the following is a brief run-down on the background and genesis of the Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Task Force's Report, "Elements of U.S. Strategy to Deal with 'Wars of National Liberation'."

2. Mr. Robert Komer of Mr. McGeorge Bundy's staff at the White House told me that the idea for a task force on the problems of counter-
ing Communist insurgency was discussed by Mr. Rostow with Mr. Bundy early in February 1961, that it was included in a "list of planning actions" prepared by Mr. Bundy, and that it was approved by the President in mid-February, 1961. Mr. Komer believes that this was done orally, without formal record, and that Mr. Bundy notified [REDACTED] by phone.

3. [REDACTED] told me he believed that Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Task Force was constituted at the initiative of the informal "luncheon group" comprising Messrs. [REDACTED] McGhee, Rostow, and Nitze. He believed that this was done to forestall Defense Department action on the 1 February 1961 Presidential NSC directive which required "that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with other interested agencies, should examine means for placing more emphasis on the development of counter-guerrilla forces." This directive was communicated to the Secretary of Defense by Mr. McGeorge Bundy on February 3, 1961 as NSAM No. 2.

4. The Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Task Force was established under the chairmanship of [REDACTED], with General Landsdale (Defense), Mr. Rostow (White House), and Mr. Ramsey (State) as the other members. [REDACTED] was designated as secretary. The members participated as individuals and did not bind their organizations.

5. According to [REDACTED] the Defense Department deferred action on NSAM No. 2 pending a report by [REDACTED] task force. The Defense Department had, however, in the meantime been acting in this general field in response to NSAM No. 56 (June 28, 1961) on inventorying paramilitary assets; NSAM No. 57 (June 28, 1961) on the division of responsibility for

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paramilitary operations; NSAM No. 86 (September 5, 1961) on Latin American counter-guerrilla training; NSAM No. 110 (October 25, 1961) on FY 1963 paramilitary budgetary requirements and NSAM No. 114 (November 22, 1961) on counter-subversion training for friendly police and armed forces.

6. There had been other, previous initiatives in the counter-guerrilla field, notably an August 1960 report by a State-JCS Counter-Guerrilla Study Group. but there were no definitive organizational or doctrinal recommendations or decisions.

7. The Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Task Force initially solicited and received written contributions from Defense, State, and CIA, which, at request, I attempted to integrate into a single document around March 1961. [redacted] was subsequently taken on as a consultant to redraft the document. Mr. Rostow redrafted [redacted] paper. I redrafted Mr. Rostow's redraft, reorganizing it, strengthening its provisions on covert activities, counter-guerrilla paramilitary tactics, and civic action, and inserting [redacted] paper on offensive counter-measures. My revision reflected my understanding of the views of Brigadier General Lansdale on his Philippines experience and Civic Action, the views of [redacted] on guerrilla and counter-guerrilla tactics, and the thoughts of [redacted] on the importance of vitalizing a country's political processes and opening political communication channels for the airing and redress of popular grievances as prerequisites to other reforms. I also incorporated Mr. Henry Ramsey's thoughts on the importance of an effective OISP civil police program to supplement the military counter-guerrilla measures. The sections on Covert Programs were essentially my own. In my rewrite, I preserved as much of Mr. Rostow's language as possible and attempted to conform my various insertions to his rather informal and colorful style. The resulting draft was circulated on 20 November 1961 and was the basis for the final 8 December 1961 version, which added conclusions and recommendations and made some very minor changes in the basic text.

CA/ [redacted]

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